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AGOA or EBA? 
Abstract 
 
The United States (US) and European Union (EU) both have preferential trade agreements with least 
developed countries with the aim of increasing trade volumes in order to catalyse development. The US 
implemented their system, the “African Growth and Opportunity Act” (AGOA) in 2000 and the EU 
followed with “Everything But Arms” (EBA) in 2001. Since these preference systems have the goal of 
increasing development by raising export earnings, it is important to analyse whether or not they fulfil 
their goal and if not, how they should change in order to become more effective. This paper aims at 
comparing the two systems in order to investigate which system is more effective in its goal of increasing 
trade volumes. Unlike other studies, this paper includes both systems in one model in order make an 
accurate comparison. Using a gravity model, trade volumes from least developed countries to the US and 
EU15 were analysed over the time period 1998-2006. The results show that neither AGOA nor EBA have 
any significant effect on trade volumes, and thus the systems should be reviewed and improved in order to 
fulfil their goals.  
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Generalized System of Preferences, GSP 	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Abbreviations used in paper: 
 
ACP – African Caribbean Pacific  
 
AGOA – African Growth and Opportunity Act 
 
CGE  - Computable General Equilibrium model 
 
CDP – Center for Development Policy 
 
EBA – Everything But Arms 
 
EU – The European Union 
 
GATT – Generalized Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
 
GSP – Generalized System of Preference 
 
LDCs – Less Developed Countries 
 
MFN – Most Favored Nation 
 
OLS – Ordinary Least Squares 
 
PTA – Preferential Trade Agreement 
 
SSA – Sub-Saharan African 
 
UN – United Nations 
 
US – United States 
 
WTO – World Trade Organization 
 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference of Trade and Development 
 
QUAD – Canada, EU, Japan, US 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare two non-reciprocal trade preference systems: the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) implemented by the United States (US) in 2000 and Everything But 
Arms (EBA) implemented by the European Union (EU) in 2001, in order to evaluate which one has 
been more successful in its goal of increasing trade volumes with Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
 
Trade is argued to be an important mechanism for economic growth and development. However, 
many LDCs struggle to access and be competitive on the international market and therefore are 
hindered from expanding their export industries. For the sake of this paper, LDCs are defined as 
outlined by the United Nation’s (UN) Center for Development Policy (CDP)1. All countries listed as 
LDCs in the time period 1998-2006 are included in this study, see appendix 1 for a complete list. Non-
reciprocal trade preferences are policies enacted by more developed countries offering lower trade 
barriers to LDCs than they do to other more developed countries, and where the preference-receiving 
country is not expected to make any market access concessions in return. These are enacted in order to 
facilitate increased export earnings through two goals: a larger volume of exports and more diversified 
exports (Persson, 2013). Since these policies represent an active decision by a developed country to 
assist LDCs in their economic growth and development, it is relevant to examine whether or not they 
have been successful, and what determines their success. It is especially important to evaluate AGOA 
as the act is reaching its expiration date in 2015, and policymakers considering to renew or amend the 
act should be aware of its strengths and weaknesses in order to be able to maximize its potential.  
 
Although several studies have looked at the effectiveness of the two systems separately, none have 
compared the system in one model. This paper fills that gap in the research and makes a contribution 
by providing a direct comparative analysis of AGOA and EBA. This is especially important since 
exporting countries can decide which preferences to export under, and any differences in the 
effectiveness of the preferences might affect trade patterns.  
 
In order to properly compare the effects of these two trade preference systems, it is necessary to 
construct a counterfactual. This means creating a model that looks at what trade flows would have 
been like without the existence of the preferences in our study (Persson and Wihelmsson, 2007). This 
paper will use a gravity model to estimate which system has a more significant effect. The data used in 
this model is based on the gravity-model dataset provided by the CEPII spanning the time period 
1998-2006. Since AGOA was implemented in 2000 and EBA in 2001, this is an appropriate timespan 
in order to capture the effects of both systems. The data has been restricted to only look at the EU15 as 
the EU importers as well as the US. The EU15 includes only the original 15 EU member countries2 as 
opposed to the 28 current member countries. This simplification is due to the fact that the EU15 were 
EU member countries when both preference systems were implemented. The countries included as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The CDP includes having a low per capita gross domestic product (GDP), structural barriers to growth, a small 
share of manufacturing in total GDP and low literacy rates as criteria for being classified as an LDC. 
2 The EU15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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exporters are all countries that were considered LDCs by the United Nations during each of the years 
1998-2006.   
 
The paper begins with a general outline of the economic effects of General Systems of Preferences 
(GSP) in section 2 before outlining the economic effects of preferences being granted in section 3. 
Section 4 follows with a more specific description of both AGOA and EBA, outlining details 
regarding eligibility, product coverage and preference margins, stability of access and rules of origin. 
This is followed by an overview of previous literature on the subject in section 5 before the empirical 
strategy is introduced and explained in section 6. In section 7 the results are presented and discussed.  
2. Background to Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP)  
 
Both AGOA and EBA are non-reciprocal trade preference systems that have been implemented as 
extensions of the US and EU Generalized System of Preference (GSP). 
 
GSP has its roots in the second United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
conference in 1968, Resolution 21 (II) that called for the establishment of “generalized, non-
reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of developing countries, including 
special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries” (UNCTAD, 2013).  
 
The goal of these preferences is to: 
a) Increase export earnings for developing countries 
b) Promote industrialization 
c) Accelerate developing countries’ rates of economic growth (UNCTAD, 2013) 
 
Under these systems, selected products originating in developing countries are granted reduced or zero 
tariff rates compared to the existing Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rates, with special preferential 
treatment given to the LDCs. This is a clear contradiction to the rule of non-discrimination outlined in 
Article 1 of GATT, which states that countries cannot discriminate against each other, and thus must 
grant the same preferences to all its trading partners (WTO, 2014b). However, the GSP resolution 
received a wavier, the “GSP Decision” in 1971, which authorized the scheme for a 10-year period. In 
1979 this was replaced by the Enabling Clause, entitled “Differential and more favorable treatment, 
reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries”, which created a permanent wavier to the 
MFN-clause and allowed for preference-giving countries to grant preferential tariff treatment under 
their GSP indefinitely (WTO 2014a). There is no global GSP program that all countries adhere to. 
Instead, developed countries implement their own GSP programs. This has created a web of 
overlapping GSP systems, which may affect the utilization-levels of specific preference systems.  
 
Since the Enabling Clause does not specify any regulations regarding product coverage or other 
conditions that might restrict preferences from being granted (Persson, 2013), the GSP regimes 
implemented by different countries may vary significantly. These differences might affect how 
successful the systems have been, and should therefore be further evaluated in order to better 
understand and potentially adjust the regimes currently in place.  
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We will explain AGOA and EBA in detail in section 4, but first the expected economic effects of 
preference systems will be examined.  
3. Economic effects of preferential access 
  
In order to understand why it is beneficial for LDCs to export to the US and EU under the two 
preference systems, the economic effects of the preferential access must be analyzed. The following 
analysis is based on Grossman & Sykes, 2005.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the economy of a small exporting country and what happens when it is granted 
preferential access after facing an MFN-tariff at the rate TMFN.  
 
Figure 1. Analysis of the effects of trade preferences for a small preference-receiving economy  
 
The world market price in the illustrated market is P1.  Before preferences are granted, the exporting 
country must pay the MFN-tariff, and sell their output at price P1/(1+TMFN) in order to stay competitive 
(Grossman and Sykes, 2005). At this price, exports from the illustrated country will equal Q3-Q2. 
When the preference is granted, the country in question no longer pays the MFN-tariff. This means 
that they now are able to charge the higher price of P1 and still be competitive on the foreign market. 
Due to the higher sales price, following the law of supply, output will expand to Q4. Local demand, 
however, will contract to Q1 due to the increased sales price. Both these effects cause exports to 
increase to Q4 – Q1. The gains for producers are twofold: they are able to export more units, and also 
receive a higher price for each unit sold. This increases producer surplus by the areas a + b + c, 
however at the expense to local consumers who now consume less due to the increased price. This is 
illustrated by the loss of consumer surplus, area a + b, in the above figure. The net-effect of this 
change in welfare is + c, which illustrates that AGOA and EBA should increase welfare for small 
exporting countries. 
 
Supply 
Demand 
 
  Q1   Q2   Q3  Q4 
 P1 
 
P1/(1+TMFN) 
a 
 
b c 
Price 
 
Quantity 
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Important to note is that the above analysis discusses the case for a small economy that does not affect 
the world market price. On many markets this would be the case for developing countries since they 
export relatively small volumes. However, on certain markets these developing countries are the main 
exporters and therefore any preference given to them in those markets would affect the world market 
price. For example, Madagascar is the world’s largest exporter of vanilla (FAO, 2009) and would 
therefore be a large economy on the market for vanilla and also affect world market price. The 
analysis for this case is slightly different, and has significant consequences on the welfare of the 
preference-receiving country.  
 
Figure 2. Analysis of the effects of trade preferences for a large preference-receiving economy3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Just like before, the domestic price in the preference-receiving country will increase to P1 when 
preferences are granted, as illustrated in the left-hand panel. However, in this case the analysis does 
not end there. Instead, the increase in exports from the preference-receiving will shift the world supply 
of the good outward and thus reduce the world market equilibrium price to P2 (post-GSP) as illustrated 
in the right-hand panel. This means that the preference-receiving country benefits from a smaller terms 
of trade gain than before since the price of their exports increases relatively less than in the case for a 
small economy. Thus, the welfare gain for the larger economy will be significantly smaller, area “a” 
on the above diagram, as opposed to the larger area “c” in figure 1.  
 
In summary, when countries are granted preferential access, ceteris paribus, we expect the value of 
their exports to increase. We will test this empirically in section 6 of the paper. Next, we will 
introduce the two systems in more detail.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Grossman & Sykes, 2005 
Market in preference-
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4. The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Everything But Arms 
 
In order to gain an understanding of why there might be differences in the effectiveness of the two 
systems, this section will compare AGOA and EBA by looking at how countries become eligible, 
what products are covered, and the rules of origin of the two different systems. This background 
information should allow for a hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of the systems to be made. 
4.1 AGOA background 
 
AGOA is a United States Trade Act enacted on May 18th 2000 as Public Law 106 of the 200th congress  
(AGOA, 2014a) extending preferences previously only available under the US GSP (AGOA, 2014a). 
The GSP program, instituted on 1 January 1979, is designed to promote economic growth in the 
developing world by providing duty-free access entry for up to 5000 products when imported from 
one of the 123 designated GSP beneficiary countries (Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 2014). AGOA extends preferences with the goal of significantly enhancing access to 
the US market by providing duty-free entry for qualifying Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. 
AGOA also provides duty-free access to all clothing and certain textiles exported from countries that 
qualify under the act’s “wearing apparel provisions”, provided Rules of Origin are met (AGOA, 
2014d). 
 
AGOA’s goal of promoting economic growth and development is outlined in section 102 of the Trade 
and Development Act of 2000. It emphasizes that it is in the mutual interest of the US and the 
countries of SSA to promote stable and sustainable growth and development in SSA. It also highlights 
the fact that offering the countries of SSA enhanced trade preferences will encourage both higher 
levels of trade and foreign direct investment in support of the positive economic and political 
developments under way throughout the region (Trade and Development Act of 2000, pp. 252-253). 
AGOA originally covered the eight-year period after it came into effect in October 2000 until 
September 2008, and was later extended until 2015. 
 
Most AGOA countries were already eligible for preferences under the original US GSP. However, the 
preferences granted under AGOA benefit these countries further by increasing the stability of access 
as well as preference margins.   
4.2 EBA background 
 
Everything But Arms (EBA) is a special arrangement for least developed countries (LDCs) under the 
European Union (EU) GSP.  
 
The EU GSP has three strands: 
1. GSP general arrangement which applies to all beneficiary countries 
2. GSP+, which entirely removes tariffs on the same product categories as those covered by the 
general arrangement. In order to be eligible, countries must ratify and implement international 
conventions relating to human and labor rights, environment and good governance. 
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3. Everything But Arms, which is a special arrangement for least developed countries giving 
them duty-free and quota-free access for all products, except arms and ammunitions 
(European Commission, 2014b).  
 
The initiative was signed on February 28 2001 and provides LDCs with duty-free access to the 
European market to imports of all products except arms and munitions, without any quantitative 
restrictions. The decision was made, as outlined in article 7 of the European Commission Council 
Regulation, due to the increasing marginalization of LDCs in the world economy (Council Regulation 
416/2001).  
 
Once the benefits are granted, the beneficiary country receives benefits until the UN removes the 
country from the list of LDCs, in which case it is withdrawn from the list of beneficiaries with a 
minimum transitional period of three years  (UNCTAD, 2011). The special arrangement does not have 
an expiry date as the preferential market access was granted for an unlimited period of time (Council 
Regulation 416/2001). However, there can be a provisional suspension of preferences if the European 
Community’s financial interests are at stake due to massive increases in imports of products from 
LDCs (Council Regulation 416/2001). Preferences can also be withdrawn temporarily if there have 
been serious and systematic violations of social rights or principles of labor law or certain other 
serious circumstances (Council Regulation 2501/2001).  
 
This paper will use data looking at imports to the EU15 countries (listed in appendix 2).  
4.3 Comparing the systems: Eligibility  
 
It is important to note the difference between which countries can become eligible for the two systems. 
EBA is open for any LDCs whereas AGOA is restricted to specifically countries in SSA. 
 
The processes of becoming eligible for preferences under AGOA and EBA differ. The more 
complicated the process is, the smaller the expected benefits from the preferences will be since fewer 
LDCs will be able to access the benefits. This section will outline how to become eligible for AGOA 
and EBA respectively.  
AGOA 
 
In order to qualify for preferences under AGOA, the President of the US must see that the applicant 
country has established or is making continual progress towards establishing… (Trade and 
Development Act of 2000) 
a) A market-based economy that protects private property rights 
b) The rule of law that guarantees fair trials and equal treatment by the law 
c) The elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment by providing national 
treatment4, protecting intellectual property rights and resolving bilateral trade disputes 
d) Economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability of health care, educational 
opportunities and expand physical infrastructure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “National treatment” meaning that US products should be treated the same as national products once they are 
on the LDC market. 
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e) A system to combat corruption 
f) Protection of internationally recognized worker rights 
 
The country in question may not be engaged in activities threatening US national security, be engaged 
in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or aiding acts of international terrorism. 
The preferences can be terminated if an eligible SSA country is not making continual progress in 
meeting these requirements (Trade and Development Act of 2000). A country does not automatically 
receive preferences under AGOA when it fulfills the correct criteria, but instead must apply for 
eligibility. This is a process that takes time and is costly for the applicant country due to administrative 
procedures, and might reduce the positive effects of AGOA. 
 
Table 1 lists all countries that were eligible for AGOA under the years covered by this study, as well 
as if any of these countries lost eligibility within this time span. Note that all countries on the list are 
not included in the study as they are not all classified as LDCs.  
 
Table 1. List of AGOA eligible countries during the years 1998-2006 
Country  Preferences received 
Angola 2003 
Benin 2000 
Botswana* 2000 
Burkina Faso 2006 
Burundi 2000 
Cameroon* 2004 
Congo (Democratic 
republic) 
2000 
Cap Verde 2003 
Chad 2000 
Congo (Republic)* 2000 
Djibouti 2000 
Ethiopia 2000 
Gabon* 2000 
Guinea 2000 
Gambia 2000 
Ghana* 2002 
Guinea-Bissau 2000 
Kenya* 2000 
Liberia 2006 
Lesotho 2000 
Mali 2000 
Mozambique 2000 
Mauritania** 2000 
Mauritius* 2000 
Malawi 2000 
Namibia* 2000 
Niger 2000 
Rwanda 2000 
Senegal 2000 
Seychelles* 2000 
South Africa* 2000 
Sierra Leone 2002 
Swaziland* 2001 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
2000 
Tanzania 2000 
Uganda 2000 
Zambia 2000 
 
*Countries that are not classified as LDCs and thus not a part of this study.  
**Mauritania lost its AGOA eligibility in 2005 
 	  
Figure 3 illustrates a map of all AGOA eligible countries.  
 
Figure 3. Map of AGOA-eligible countries 
 
Note: Not all AGOA beneficiaries are classified as LDCs and thus will not be included in this study.  
 
EBA 
 
In order to be eligible for the special arrangement under EBA, the country must be recognized and 
classified as an LDC by the UN. These are illustrated in the below figure, and listed in appendix 1. 
 
Figure 4. Map of LDCs as defined by the UN 1998 
 
 
As opposed to AGOA, countries are free to export under EBA preferences without applying for 
preferences. Exporters still need to apply for preferential treatment when they export, but the country 
in itself does not need to apply to become eligible for the preferences. This might make countries more 
likely to export under EBA since the preferences are more easily accessible. Due to this, we expect 
EBA to have a more significant effect on exports from LDCs.  
 
Below, table 2 lists of countries eligible for EBA. All countries received preferences in 2002, with the 
exception of Timor-Leste that received preferences in 2005. No countries have lost eligibility within 
the time period of this study.  
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Table 2: Countries eligible for EBA between 1998-2006 
 
Country  
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cap Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo Democratic republic 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Kiribati 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste* 
Togo 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Yemen  
Zambia 
* Became eligible 2005. 
 
4.4 Comparing the systems: Product coverage and preference margins  
 
Product coverage is important because, generally speaking, the more products that are covered by the 
preference system, the larger the potential gains from the system are since countries will be able to 
increase exports in many different sectors. This section aims to compare the level of product coverage 
of AGOA and EBA in order to evaluate any potential differences.  
 
A preference margin is defined as the absolute difference between the MFN rate of duty and the 
preferential rate of duty for the like product (WTO, 2014a). However, for the sake of this paper it is 
more useful to look at the margin between the GSP tariff rates and the AGOA or EBA tariff rate 
respectively since this determines how large the change in tariff rates is when preferences are 
introduced. Preference margins are a significant part of the analysis regarding whether or not 
preferences will be effective or not. If the margins are relatively high, we expect a larger effect of 
preferences than if the margin is relatively low. This section will also compare the preference margins 
provided by AGOA and EBA respectively.  
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AGOA product coverage and preference margins 
 
AGOA provides duty-free treatment for any article that is not deemed to be “import sensitive”, 
meaning that it would significantly affect domestic production in the US. These include agricultural 
commodities such as sugar, dairy and beef (Costello, 2009). Import sensitive products are generally 
speaking products with relatively high duties, on average over 30% (Brenton and Hoppe, 2006), and 
thus excluding them from preference should have a significant effect on the impact of the preferences. 
The fact that these products do not receive preferences also demonstrates that there still are significant 
barriers to trade for SSA countries trying to export to the US.  AGOA covers products under two 
categories: apparel and non-apparel. On average, the preference margin under AGOA is 7.7% 
(Brenton and Hoppe, 2006). 
 
Within the category of non-apparel goods, AGOA provides an additional 1800 items with a zero duty 
as compared to the US GSP system, covering over 6400 items (Frazer and Biesebroeck, 2010). For 
manufactured goods, the average preference margin is over 12%. However, it is worth noting that 
more than 900 tariff lines for manufactured goods are not covered by AGOA, and for these products 
the average duty remains around 9% (Brenton and Hoppe, 2006). Regarding agriculture, AGOA 
liberalizes only 26 additional tariff lines, which corresponds on only 12% of the remaining dutiable 
lines (Brenton and Hoppe, 2006). This leaves over 200 agricultural tariff lines with no preferences 
under AGOA (Brenton and Hoppe, 2006).  
 
Under the category of apparel goods, AGOA allows for special provisions for certain apparel articles. 
In order to obtain AGOA benefits on these textiles, the exporter must provide specific information 
proving their eligibility (Costello, 2009), which takes time and is costly. It is also worth noting that 
there still are goods exported to the US under no preferences at all since the MFN-tariff for that 
product already is zero, and thus the preference margin is non-existent (Brenton and Hoppe, 2006). 
 
In order to get a more clear understanding of AGOA, the below table summarizes the preference 
margins for particular goods.  
 
Table 3. Overview of preference margins of AGOA  
Goods in question Preference margin (%) 
AGOA-eligible goods on average 7,7 
AGOA-eligible manufactured goods on average 12,0 
Manufactured goods not included in AGOA on average  9,0 
Import-sensitive goods excluded from AGOA on average 30,0 
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Product coverage and preference margins EBA 
 
Under EBA, all LDCs are granted preferential access for all products, except for arms and munitions. 
EBA extends tariff free and quota free access to the EU market to 919 tariff lines that had not already 
received preference under other systems. The majority of these are agricultural products, meats, 
vegetables, fruit and prepared foodstuffs (Brenton, 2003).  
 
However, when EBA was implemented, preferences were differentiated depending on the sensitivity 
of the product. Tariffs on non-sensitive products were suspended completely, whereas sensitive 
products enjoyed a tariff reduction sufficiently large to motivate traders (Council Regulation 
2501/2001). For specific duties, the reduction was set at 30%, and for ad valorem duties, the reduction 
was set at 3,5% (Council Regulation 2501/2001). The exception for sensitive products was 
implemented on the market for fresh bananas, rice and sugar as they were classified as particularly 
sensitive to the EU market. For these products, there was a transitory period to grant duty-free access, 
and the tariffs for these products were progressively reduced until they reached zero. For bananas, this 
was in 2006, and for rice and sugar 2009 (Council Regulation 416/2001).  
 
Another important detail to note is that many products receiving preference under EBA already 
received duty free treatment under GSP or other agreements (Brenton 2003), rendering the new 
preferences useless in relation to some goods. For example, many countries that receive preferences 
under EBA are African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries that can export under Lomé preferences. 
Exporters in these countries might not decide to change to EBA preferences since they would be 
required to learn a new system. This underutilization would make EBA less effective.  
 
Due to a wider range of products being covered and a less complicated classification system, we 
expect EBA to have a more significant effect on trade volumes. Preference margins differ across 
products, but generally are larger under EBA, and thus trade volumes are expected to increase more 
under EBA preferences.  
4.5 Comparing the systems: Stability of access 
 
Another aspect that might affect how much the preference systems increase trade is how stable the 
access to the preferences is. The more secure the access to the preferences is, the more likely trade is 
to increase since there will be an incentive to invest in export markets and expand the production 
capacity without the uncertainty of losing preferences. 
 
AGOA provides more stability of access than the US GSP system previously did. This stability is 
created by the removal of the process of graduation; where countries lose preferences for goods that 
have become sufficiently competitive on the world market (AGOA 2014a). However, the preferences 
are set to expire in 2015. Regardless of the fact that AGOA has been renewed several times, the fact 
that it has an expiration date as well as the fact that it can be revoked relatively easily due to the 
negative conditionality of the preferences creates uncertainty in the beneficiary markets. EBA, 
however, has a much more stable preference system as it is offered indefinitely and cannot be 
	   15 
withdrawn at a whim. It should be noted that these preference systems are by no means a right for 
LDCs and can be revoked by the preference-granting countries.  
 
Due to the fact that EBA provides more stable access to its preferences, we expect EBA to have a 
larger positive effect on exports than AGOA. 
4.6 Comparing the systems: Rules of origin 
 
Rules of Origin are requirements that outline whether or not a product exported by a beneficiary 
country is considered to be the “economic origin” of that country. If it is not, the product will not be 
eligible to be exported under the relevant preference system. The purpose of these requirements is to 
prevent trade deflection. Trade deflection is when imports from a non-beneficiary country (country C) 
are routed through a beneficiary country (country B) before being imported into country A at the 
beneficiary country’s tariff rate without any local value-added activities having taken place (Baldwin 
and Wyplosz, 2012). The rules of origin are therefore implemented in order to stop the preferences 
from being exploited by non-beneficiary countries, which would significantly affect trade (AGOA, 
2014d).  
 
It is important to examine rules of origin since they can significantly increase costs to the preference-
receiving countries and therefore can be considered barriers to trade that counteract preferences 
(Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2012). These increased costs arise due to documentation requirements 
increasing administrative costs as well as from the fact that countries are forced to use more expensive 
domestic inputs in production instead of importing cheaper inputs from the region.  
 
Since AGOA and EBA have differing rules of origin, this section aims at outlining and comparing the 
specific rules of origin of the two systems in order to understand the main differences between them.  
 
AGOA Rules of Origin 
 
AGOA requires that products must be the “growth, product or manufacture” of an AGOA-beneficiary 
SSA country in order to be eligible, with the exception of import-sensitive products which may not be 
eligible (Trade and Development Act of 2000). Generally speaking, the rules of origin require that the 
good must be wholly produced in the beneficiary country, or that any imported materials that are used 
in the production of the export must be substantially transformed locally in order for the good to be 
eligible. The main features that outline the general rules of origin in AGOA are the following (AGOA, 
2014b): 
a) The product must be imported directly from the AGOA-country into the United States 
b) Items must be growth, product or manufacture of an AGOA-beneficiary country. This can be 
met jointly by more than one AGOA-beneficiary if one beneficiary country imports and uses 
materials from another beneficiary country in the production of goods to be exported under 
AGOA. This is called “cumulation of origin”. 
c) Products may incorporate materials sourced from outside countries, provided that the sum of 
the direct cost or value of the materials produced plus the direct costs of processing 
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undertaken in the AGOA-beneficiary country equals at least 35% of the production’s 
appraised value  
d) A total of 15% of the 35% may consist of US-originating parts and materials 
 
The GSP program on which AGOA is based does not cover apparel and textile articles. However, 
under AGOA, countries are able to receive duty-free market access for these items if or when they are 
certified as complying with the “wearing apparel” provision (AGOA, 2014c). This certification proves 
that the country has adopted an effective visa system and the related procedures to prevent unlawful 
transshipment and the use of counterfeit documents, as well as making substantial progress towards 
implementing and following customs procedures that assist the customs service in verifying the origin 
of the products (Federal Register 2001).  When the country has complied with these regulations, the 
main features of the “wearing apparel” provisions are the following (Trade and Development Act of 
2000): 
a) Apparel assembled in one or more qualifying SSA countries from fabrics wholly formed and 
cut in the US using US yarn and thread is provided with duty-free and quota-free access to the 
US market without limitations 
b) Apparel assembled in one or more qualifying SSA countries using domestically produced 
fabric and yarns, or fabrics and yarns produced in AGOA-beneficiary country, qualifies for 
preferences. These preferences are subject to quantitative restrictions (currently 3.5% of 
overall garment imports by the United States from all sources). 
c) Apparel that contains interlinings of foreign origin is not made ineligible for duty-free benefits 
as long as the value of those interlinings does not exceed 25% of the cost of the components 
of the assembled apparel article 
d) “De Minimus Rule”: Apparel containing fibers or yarns not wholly formed in the US or in one 
or more of the AGOA-beneficiary SSA countries is not made eligible if the total weight of 
those fibers and yarns does not exceed 10% of the total weight of the article (AGOA, 2014c) 
 
The Secretary of Commerce monitors the imports of the articles included in the wearing apparel 
provision on a monthly basis, and if the imports have been damaging, the preferences can be 
suspended  (Trade and Development Act of 2000). 
 
AGOA also includes a “Special Rule” for beneficiary countries that are LDCs if the LDC has a per 
capita gross national product of less than $1,500 per year in 1996 as measured by the World Bank. 
This rule allows for apparel articles wholly assembled in the one or more LDC beneficiary to be given 
preferential treatment regardless of the country of origin of the fabric used to make the products 
(Trade and Development Act of 2000).  
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EBA Rules of Origin  
 
For the EBA, the rules of origin for the EU GSP apply. In order to import under a preferential regime 
into the EU, the product needs to be originating in that country. In order for the product to be eligible, 
it must either be: 
a) “Wholly obtained” in a non-EU country: this refers to products that have no relation with any 
other country than the beneficiary country  
b) Or “sufficiently transformed” in a non-EU country: referring to products which involve more 
than just the beneficiary country, for example using materials from another country 
(European Commission, 2014a) 
 
There are three methods through which a product becomes sufficiently transformed. 
1) The change of tariff heading criterion: meaning that the finished product is classified under a 
different four-digit tariff heading than the non-originating materials are classified 
2) The ad valorem criterion: meaning that the customs value at the time of importation of non-
originating materials used may not exceed a given percentage of the sum of the costs of the 
finished product 
3) The specific process criterion: meaning that certain stages in a manufacturing process have to 
be carried out on any non-originating materials used (European Commission, 2014f)  
 
Cumulation of origin allows countries that have identical rules of origin and are in specific regional 
groups to use their combined resources to manufacture products and still be eligible for preferential 
tariff treatment (Council Regulation 1063/2010). Under the EU GSP, bilateral and regional cumulation 
is acceptable. Bilateral cumulation refers to that materials originating in the EU can be integrated in 
the products manufactured in the GSP country as long as the processing done in the GSP country goes 
beyond minimal ones. Minimal operations refer to packaging, simple cutting, simple assembling, etc. 
if only one of the aforementioned processes have taken place within the beneficiary country (European 
Commission, 2014c). Regional cumulation is only acceptable within four specific regional groupings, 
see appendix 3 for details on these regional groups  (European Commission, 2014d). 
 
The direct transport rule ensures that the imported product was sent from the “originating country” 
without being manipulated in another country  (European Commission, 2014e). 
 
Both AGOA and EBA have relatively restrictive rules of origin. Since the regulations are targeted at 
specific goods it is difficult to make a comparison of which system is more restrictive and would 
hamper export volumes more. However, in general, AGOA has more restrictive rules.  
4.7 Summary of comparisons 
 
By comparing many different aspects of the preference regimes, it seems like EBA should have a 
larger impact on trade volumes from LDCs compared to AGOA. This is due to the fact that EBA 
covers more products and has a deeper scope of preference margins than AGOA. It is also easier to 
gain access to EBA’s preferences due to a less complicated process of eligibility. Once preferences are 
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granted, they are also more stable under EBA since they have been granted for an unlimited period of 
time. Although both systems have quite restrictive rules of origin, AGOA has the more limiting 
regulations and thus EBA is expected to have a greater effect.   
5. Previous literature 
 
In order to be able to compare the results of this paper with previous research, we have reviewed 
existing literature on the subject. The majority of the research on this subject has estimated the 
effectiveness of GSP in general. Since this paper focuses on two specific GSP systems, AGOA and 
EBA, the previous literature has been restricted to cover these systems. For a general overview, see 
table 3 and table 4 below.  
 
The main methods used in the previous literature are: 
• Gravity model (used in 5 papers) 
• Analysis of trade volumes before and after preferences (used in 5 papers) 
• Partial-equilibrium model (used in 2 papers) 
• Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE, used in 2 papers)  
• Triple difference estimations (used in 2 papers) 
 
When AGOA and EBA were introduced, several studies investigated how effective the systems would 
be. Ianchovichina, et al., (2001) use a partial-equilibrium model and conclude that unrestricted market 
access could give significant benefits for SSA countries if market-access is granted from all four 
QUAD (Canada, EU, Japan, US) countries. Access to the US market alone would not increase welfare 
significantly due to the fact that the US already was quite open in the areas that SSA countries 
exported. Regarding EBA, Stevens & Kennan (2001) present a report to Oxfam arguing that EBA 
would have modest positive effects due to the limited nature of the exporting countries’ supply 
capacity that restricts the increase in exports by examining export trade flows over time.  
 
Early results of the programs were also evaluated. Mattoo & Subramanian (2003) use a partial 
equilibrium model and present positive effects of AGOA by illustrating that non-oil exports increase 
by up to 11%. They also highlight the fact that the increases could have been greater if the rules of 
origin had been less restrictive. Lederman & Özden (2004) make similar conclusions using a gravity 
model, stating that preferential market access has statistically significant effects on exports, but that 
these effects were reduced due to rules of origin restrictions. Brenton & Ikezuki (2004), however, 
examine export data over time and conclude that AGOA has not yet become beneficial to LDCs that 
are not eligible for apparel benefits. They show that exports from some AGOA-beneficiaries increase, 
but argue that the system would be more valuable if it diversified exports, which could be 
accomplished through universal access to preferences on apparel. Since these results were obtained 
very early after the implementation of AGOA, the full potential effect may not yet be observed.   
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Early research regarding EBA also shows limited positive effects. Brenton (2003) examines export 
volumes and concludes that the effects of EBA have been minor due to small preference margins, but 
also hypothesizes that the scheme has greater potential. Similarly, Cernat et al., (2003) use a CGE 
model and find EBA’s trade and welfare effects to be relatively low, except in the market for sugar 
where the effects were much more significant.  
 
Brenton and Hoppe’s (2007) paper illustrates a bleaker view of AGOA results. They analyze export 
data and conclude that “AGOA has fallen short of its potential” due to its limited product coverage 
and restrictive rules of origin, and that the only positive effects have been to apparel provisions. 
Collier and Venables (2007) use a triple difference estimation and make the same conclusion 
regarding apparel provisions, stating that the program should be redesigned as to not hinder 
specialization. Seyoum (2007) further supports these results. He uses a Wilcoxon signed rank test, and 
emphasizes the marginal size of the increase in textile exports. Further research by Tadesse and 
Fayissa (2010) uses a gravity model and concludes that AGOA has contributed to the diversification 
of exports in both manufactured and non-manufactured goods, but has a minimal effect on trade 
volumes. Frazer and Biesebroeck (2010) use a triple difference estimation and find that AGOA caused 
a 42% increase in imports to the US. The increases are most significant in the apparel sector, but 
relatively large in the manufactured sector as well. Since this research is more recent, it may have 
captured more of the effects of AGOA than the very early papers. The most recent study was by 
Zappile (2011.) She uses a gravity model and concludes that the AGOA textile benefits have no 
significant results on trade due to expiring preferences and eroding preference margins. 
 
Research comparing the two systems in one model is rare, with the exception on Nilsson (2007) who 
compared the effects of all EU and US trade policies on developing countries. This differs from our 
study as we look specifically at only AGOA and EBA and their effects on trade from LDCs. He uses a 
gravity model and finds that the EU trade preference systems are more successful due to their wider 
scope.  
 
The results from the previous research vary greatly, which is probably due to the wide variety of 
methods and datasets used, which makes it very difficult to compare the results of the studies in order 
to get an idea of whether AGOA or EBA has been more successful in increasing trade. This paper 
aims to fill that gap in the literature. Since we are using a gravity model to estimate our results, the 
five previous studies that also use a gravity model are of most interest to us.   
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Table 4. Previous research AGOA 
 
Authors Question Method Results/Conclusion 
Ianchovichina, et al. 
(2001) 
Unrestricted Market Access for Sub-
Saharan Africa: How Much is it 
Worth and Who Pays? 
Partial-equilibrium model Providing preferential access to only the US market will limit the 
effects of the preferences since the US market already is relatively 
open.  
Mattoo and 
Subramanian (2003) 
The AGOA and its Rules of Origin: 
Generosity Undermined? 
Partial-equilibrium model AGOA increases non-oil exports by up to 11%.  
Lederman and 
Özden (2004) 
US Trade preferences: All are not 
created equal  
Gravity model Countries who benefit from preferences export 2-3 times more than 
countries excluded from preferences. 
Brenton and Ikezuki 
(2004) 
 
The Initial and Potential Impact of 
Preferential Access to the US Market 
under AGOA 
No econometric analysis, instead 
analysis of trade volumes before and 
after preferences 
AGOA does not significantly affect LDCs that are not eligible for 
clothing benefits.  
Brenton and Hoppe 
(2006) 
 
The African Growth and 
Opportunity Act, Exports and 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
No econometric analysis, instead 
analysis of trade volumes before and 
after preferences 
AGOA has stimulated export diversification in some countries, but 
has not reached its potential due to restrictive rules of origin and 
limited product coverage.  
Collier and 
Venables (2007) 
Rethinking trade preferences: how 
Africa can diversify its exports 
Triple difference estimation AGOA has been effective through its apparel wavier, however needs 
to redesign its rules of origin. 
Seyoum (2007) 
 
Export performance of developing 
countries under the AGOA  
Wilcoxon signed rank test & times 
series regression analysis 
AGOA has a small positive significant effect on exports of textiles 
and apparel from beneficiary countries to the USA.  
Tadesse and Fayissa 
(2008) 
 
The Impact of African Growth and 
Opportunity Act on US Imports from 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Gravity model AGOA has increased imports from eligible SSA countries by 
initiating imports in several sectors and product categories.  
Frazer and Van 
Biesebroeck (2010) 
 
Trade Growth Under the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act 
Triple difference estimation AGOA causes a 42% increase in apparel imports and a 13% increase 
in non-apparel imports to the US.  
Zappile (2011) 
 
Nonreciprocal Trade Agreements & 
Trade: Does AGOA Increase Trade?  
Gravity model AGOA has no significant effect on trade for beneficiary countries.  
	   21 
Table 5. Previous research EBA 
 
Authors Question Method Results 
Stevens and Kennan 
(2001) 
 
The Impact of the EU’s 
“Everything But Arms” 
Proposal: A Report to Oxfam 
No econometric analysis, instead 
analysis of trade volumes before and 
after preferences 
EBA will improve access to the EU market and increase competition 
for industrialized countries. The scales of these increases are not likely 
to be large.  
Brenton (2003) 
 
Integrating the LDCs into the 
world trading system: the 
current impact of EU 
preferences under EBA 
No econometric analysis, instead 
analysis of trade volumes before and 
after preferences 
EBA has minor effects due to small preference margins. It has the 
potential to have a more substantial impact on trade through 
stimulating export diversification if the rules of origin become less 
restrictive.  
Cernat, et al. (2003) 
 
The EU’s EBA initiative and the 
Least Developed Countries 
Computable General Equilibrium model 
+ disaggregated partial equilibrium 
simulations 
EBA causes moderate welfare and trade gains, most significantly the 
sugar market.  
Yu and Jensen 
(2005) 
 
Tariff preferences, WTO 
negotiations and the LDCs: the 
case of the EBA initiative 
Computable General Equilibrium model EBA is not likely to cause significant welfare gains to LDCs due to 
low preference margins and limited product coverage. The majority of 
the gains will come from sensitive products that are subject to lengthy 
implementation.  
Nilsson (2007) Comparative effects of EU and 
US preferences 
Gravity model EU preferences have been more successful in generating exports from 
developing countries generating approximately 35% more exports.  
Faber and Orbie 
(2009) 
 
Everything but Arms: Much 
more than appears at first sight 
No econometric analysis, instead 
analysis of trade volumes before and 
after preferences 
EBA has increased imports of sugar by 160% since 2001.  
 
Aiello and 
Cardamone (2009) 
 
 
Analyzing the impact of EBA 
initiative using a gravity model 
Gravity model  EBA has mixed effects in different sectors. It creates substantial tariff 
gains for specific non-ACP LDCs on certain markets, for example in 
the exports of crustaceans and vanilla.  
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6. Empirical strategy 
 
To compare whether AGOA or EBA is more effective in increasing trade from LDCs to the EU and 
US we estimate a gravity model. The gravity model allows us to construct a counterfactual to see how 
much the countries would have traded without the preferential trade agreement. The difference 
between these scenarios is captured by the binary variables for AGOA and EBA and is interpreted as 
the effect of the exporter having access to the preferences. The model is extended to include variables 
that hinder or promote trade between the trading partners, for example whether or not the countries 
have a common language, colonial background or are landlocked. This allows us to estimate the effect 
of another outside disturbance, for example AGOA or EBA, in order to see whether it promotes or 
hinders trade and to what extent. The gravity model has been used by a large number of studies to 
assess the effects of trade policies, for instance free trade agreements, customs unions, and the WTO. 
It is, in other words, a well-established methodology for evaluating the impact of various trade 
policies. 
6.1 Sample and data 
 
The time period sampled is between 1998-2006 since AGOA was implemented in 2000 and EBA in 
2001, and this time span is enough to capture the effects of both preference systems. In order to 
simplify the model and to avoid adjusting the list of importing countries when new countries joined 
the EU, this paper focuses on imports to the EU15 countries who were the original importers granting 
preferences under EBA, as well the US. The trade values come from the UN Comtrade Database and 
present the import values for the EU15 and US. The import data was used instead of export data from 
the exporting countries since LDCs generally speaking may have less reliable data. There is 
approximately 16% missing data for trade values, which should be taken into account when analyzing 
the results of the regression. The majority of the other data used in this model, for example population 
and GDP values, are from the gravity and geodist datasets provided by the CEPII. 
 
Table 6. Variables, their expected effect on trade and source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Distance is population-weighted using a great circle formula that takes into account the distance between the 
large cities of the two countries. 
6 We have constructed the variables AGOA and EBA by collecting data regarding countries’ eligibility for both 
systems. Data was collected from the EU commission and AGOA homepage.  
Variables Effect on trade Source 
Imports to EU and US (M)  N/A UN Comtrade Database 
GDP importer + CEPII database 
GDP exporter + CEPII database 
Population importer + CEPII database 
Population exporter + CEPII database 
Distance5 - CEPII database 
Colony + CEPII database 
Common language + CEPII database 
AGOA + Constructed binary variables6 
EBA + Constructed binary variables 
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We have chosen Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as our main model estimator since it is the 
traditionally used technique for estimation of a gravity model in a log-linear form (Kepaptsoglou, et 
al., 2010). Studies have suggested that OLS might not be the best estimator. Silva and Silvana (2006) 
argue that OLS estimations suffer from bias due to heteroskedasticity and the presence of zeroes in 
data that disappear when both sides of the model are logged. They suggest using a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood method instead. While acknowledging that OLS is associated with certain 
problems, and that more advanced alternative methodologies should ideally be used, we will use OLS 
as our estimator. In order to control for heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are used throughout.     
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the data, the following figures illustrate average bilateral trade 
values before and after the implementation of AGOA and EBA respectively. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a comparison of the average bilateral trade values to the US from AGOA-eligible 
countries during the years before and after AGOA was implemented in 2000. Here we can see that 
average trade values after AGOA was implemented have more than doubled, suggesting that AGOA 
has had a positive impact on trade. Similarly, figure 6 compares trade values from LDCs to the EU15 
before and after the implementation of EBA. Just like with AGOA there is an increase in the trade 
values from LDCs to the EU15 after the implementation of EBA in 2001, suggesting it may have had 
a positive effect on trade flows. This gives us an idea of how trade has developed in the time period of 
1998-2006, we have not controlled for other variables that might affect trade other than AGOA and 
EBA. In order to do so, we will build up a gravity model to estimate the effects of both systems and 
thus see which system is more effective.  
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Figure 5. Imports to the US from LDCs before 
and after the implementation of AGOA	   Figure 6. Imports to the EU15 from LDCs before and after the implementation of EBA	  
	   24 
6.2 Main model estimation 
 
The main model we will use is presented in equation 1 below. We will test the robustness of this 
scaled down baseline specification further on in the paper.  
 
ln(Mijt) = β1 + β 2 ln(GDPit) + β 3 ln(GDPjt)+ β 4 ln(Popit)+ β 5 ln(Popjt)+
β 6 ln(Distij)+ β 7Colonyij + β 8ComLangij + β 9AGOAijt + β10EBAijt + ε ijt   
 
Subscript j refers to the LDC exporters and i represents the importers (EU15 and the US) during the 
years t specified in the model. Since we are interested in whether AGOA or EBA has had a more 
significant effect on trade, the dependent variable is exports to the US and EU from LDCs. β1 is a 
constant and is therefore not relevant in our analysis. Similarly, ε is as an error term and will not be 
analyzed.  
 
The GDP of both exporters and importers is expected to have a positive effect on trade. The GDP of 
exporting countries will increase trade since export supply increases when GDP increases. The GDP 
of importing countries should have a positive effect since import demand increases at a higher GDP 
level. Exporter population should have a positive effect on trade since a larger population should mean 
a larger work force that is able to produce and supply a larger volume of goods. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that increases in population do not necessarily guarantee a larger work force 
in LDCs, as well as the fact that there might be supply capacity constraints that restrict increases in 
output. Importer population should have a positive effect on trade since a larger population will 
demand more goods. The distance between the exporting LDC and its importing partner should have a 
negative effect on trade since increased distances increases transport and transaction costs. Transport 
costs increase with larger distances, and transaction costs increase due to worsened information flows. 
 
The binary variables included in the model are whether or not the trading partners have a colonial 
history together (Colony) and whether the counties have a common language. Colony should have a 
positive effect on trade since countries that have been a colony generally have strong trading ties with 
their prior colonizers. Common Language is expected to have a positive effect on trade since it should 
reduce trade and transaction costs.  
 
The last binary variables, AGOA, whether or not the LDC is a beneficiary of AGOA, or EBA, whether 
or not the LDC is a beneficiary of EBA,, are of most interest since they will estimate AGOA’s and 
EBA’s effect on trade volumes. The effect on trade is expected to be positive in both cases.  
 
Using the results from this model, we will test the following hypothesis in order to determine which 
preference scheme has a larger effect: 
 
H0 :β9 − β10 = 0 	  
 
If there is a statistically significant difference between the coefficients, we will interpret this as one of 
the preference systems having a greater effect than the other. 
(1) 
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7. Empirical Results: Effects of AGOA and EBA   
7.1 Results from the baseline model 
 
The results from our main model OLS regression are presented in column 1 of table 7.  The results of 
certain variables differ greatly from what we expected. GDP importer has a negative significant effect, 
and Distance does not have a significant effect. However the variables GDP exporter, Population 
importer, Population exporter, Colony and Common Language have positive significant effects, which 
is in line with our previous hypothesis in section 6.2. The results for AGOA and EBA are also 
surprising. AGOA has a significant negative effect and EBA does not have any significant effect. These 
results may be due to unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
Table 7. Results 
Variable Main model  
OLS 
Main model 
Panel 
Extension 1 
Panel 
Extension 2 
Panel 
Combination 
Panel 
GDP importer -0.440*** 
(0.000) 
0.332 
(0.211) 
0.320 
  (0.269) 
0.195 
  (0.514) 
-0.579 
(0.423) 
GDP exporter 0.807*** 
(0.000) 
0.664*** 
(0.000) 
0.700*** 
   (0.000) 
0.737*** 
   (0.000) 
0.724*** 
(0.000) 
Population importer 1.755*** 
(0.000) 
1.082*** 
(0.000) 
1.083*** 
   (0.001) 
-1.265 
   (0.689) 
0.736 
(0.870) 
Population exporter 0.292*** 
(0.000) 
-1.207 
(0.144) 
-1.443 
  (0.486) 
-1.352 
  (0.150) 
-1.429 
(0.494) 
Distance -0.069 
(0.454) 
-2.781*** 
(0.000) 
-2.828*** 
  (0.000) 
-3.178*** 
  (0.000) 
-3.162*** 
(0.000) 
Colony 1.072*** 
(0.000) 
0.904*** 
(0.001) 
0.932*** 
    (0.001) 
1.491*** 
    (0.000) 
1.493*** 
(0.000) 
Common Language 0.496*** 
(0.000) 
0.599*** 
(0.008) 
0.580** 
     (0.010) 
-0.058 
     (0.763) 
-0.059 
(0.762) 
AGOA -1.346*** 
(0.000) 
-0.078 
(0.864) 
-0.259 
  (0.592) 
-0.175 
  (0.727) 
-0.244 
(0.636) 
EBA -0.042 
(0.571) 
-0.152* 
(0.063) 
-0.493* 
  (0.059) 
-0.054 
  (0.514) 
-0.181 
(0.486) 
R2 0.5469 0.4599 0.4605 0.5362 0.5369 
Exporter Fixed 
Effects  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  No No  Yes  No  Yes 
Importer Fixed effects  No No  No  Yes Yes 
 
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the model has been successively extended to include 
more variables. Since each exporting country has unique institutional, geographic and other 
characteristics that may affect trade volumes, a panel data method with fixed effects for the exporting 
countries can be used in order to estimate the results. This should work better with the large dataset 
since it controls for unobserved variables that do not change over time but that do change across 
countries and thus accounts for heterogeneity between countries. Column 2, main model, panel 
presents results using a fixed effect estimator on our main model instead of OLS. In this specification, 
Note: the parentheses show the robust p-values and the asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**) and 10% (*) levels.  	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unobserved exporter heterogeneity is captured by the inclusion of exporter-specific effects. Column 3, 
extension 1 panel, further builds on the model by creating a time fixed effect7. This fixed effect picks 
up factors that vary over time but not across bilateral trading partners and that are not explicitly 
included in our model, for example business cycle effects. Column 4, Extension 2 panel, is another 
version of our main model panel regression. Instead of controlling for time heterogeneity as we did in 
column 3, we now control for importer heterogeneity by creating an importer fixed effect8. The final 
column includes controls for both time and importer heterogeneity. This captures unobserved 
heterogeneity on several different levels in order to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias. 
 
When we look at the main model panel regression in column 2, these results are closer to what we 
expected as Distance has a significant negative effect on trade. However, the effects of GDP importer 
and AGOA are no longer significant. Additionally, EBA now has a negative and significant effect on 
trade. When further controls for time heterogeneity are included in Extension 1 panel, the results do 
not change significantly. However, when we control for importer heterogeneity in Extension 2 panel, 
the results differ. Now, neither AGOA nor EBA have a significant effect on trade values. When we 
have time fixed effects as well as importer fixed effects in Combination panel, there is no great change 
from Extension 2 panel, but since this model controls for the most heterogeneity, we will use these 
results in our analysis.  
 
In the results from Combination panel, the variable GDP importer does not have a significant effect 
on the trade values from LDCs to the importing countries. GDP exporter, however has a positive 
effect significant at the 1% level. This seems accurate as an increase in GDP corresponds to a higher 
level of production and exports in the exporting country in question. Neither Population importer nor 
Population exporter has a significant effect. This differs from our expectations, but could be 
reasonable since other factors may affect trade values significantly more than the population of the 
countries. Distance has a large negative effect on trade values significant at the 1% level. This is in 
line with our prior hypothesis that larger distances reduce trade volumes due to increased costs of 
transportation and transaction. Colony has a large positive effect on trade values significant at the 1% 
level. This is also in line with our prior hypothesis since countries that have been a colony generally 
have strong trading ties with their prior colonizers. Common Language does not have a significant 
effect. However, since countries that have been colonies generally speak the same language as their 
prior colonizers, the effect of common language could have been picked up by Colony.  
 
The results for AGOA and EBA are surprising. In our extended model Combination panel, neither 
system seems to have any form of significant effect on export volumes since their significance levels 
are far beyond even a 10% level. However, this differs from our original OLS results where AGOA’s 
effect was estimated to be significant and negative. Although a fixed effect estimator is more 
appropriate since it controls for heterogeneity across importers and years, it is difficult to come to any 
strong conclusion since the results vary across our methods. Due to the insignificance of our results of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The binary variables for each year have been manually added to the dataset. 
8 The binary variables for each importer have been manually added to the dataset.	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AGOA and EBA, a hypothesis test will not give any significant results regarding whether AGOA or 
EBA is more effective in increasing trade volumes9.  
7.2 Robustness 
 
In order to test the accuracy of our specification, we have performed several robustness checks on the 
Combination panel model. Firstly, we test when the effect of AGOA and EBA takes place by altering 
our AGOA and EBA binary variables. In column 1, the binary variables are changed to correspond to 
AGOA and EBA being implemented one year in advance. This is tested since expectations of future 
preference may change exporters behavior prior to the preferences being implemented.  In column 2, 
the binary variables are lagged two years after the implementation of AGOA and EBA respectively. 
This is tested since it might take time for exporters to react to preference changes and thus the effect of 
the preferences may not be picked up until a few years after they are implemented. Finally, we test the 
effect of only including SSA exporting countries. Since AGOA only includes these countries, 
restricting our exporting countries to this region would make our dataset as homogenous as possible 
by removing additional unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Table 8. Robustness checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All results are using exporter FE, time FE and importer FE. The parentheses show the robust p-
values and the asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.  
 
The results in column 1 do not differ greatly from our above-analyzed results. This suggests that 
expectations of changing preferences did not affect trade before AGOA and EBA were introduced. 
Similarly, when looking at only the SSA exporter (column 3), there is no substantial change from our 
main results. The only considerable change observed is that EBA has a negative effect on trade 
significant at the 10% level when we lag the effect of AGOA and EBA, as can be seen in column 2. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In order to be consistent, we tested the hypothesis and got a coefficient of -0.063 with a p-value of 0.900. This 
is far from significant and therefore not useful in our analysis.   
Variable Lag one 
year 
earlier  
Lag two 
tears later  
Only SSA 
exporters 
GDP, importer -0.649 
(0.246) 
-0.548 
(0.470) 
-1.150 
  (0.191) 
GDP, exporter 0.721*** 
(0.000) 
0.722*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
   (0.000) 
Population, importer 0.881 
(0.812) 
0.621 
(0.888) 
1.998 
   (0.720) 
Population, exporter -1.357 
(0.519) 
-1.364 
(0.512) 
-1.861 
  (0.546) 
Distance -3.131*** 
(0.000) 
-3.166*** 
(0.000) 
-3.171*** 
  (0.007) 
Colony 1.494*** 
(0.000) 
1.493*** 
(0.000) 
1.546*** 
    (0.000) 
Common Language -0.059 
(0.761) 
-0.059 
(0.760) 
-0.034 
     (0.895) 
AGOA -0.352 
(0.488) 
-0.298 
(0.542) 
-0.308 
  (0.565) 
EBA -0.230 
(0.189) 
-0.311* 
(0.098) 
-0.210 
  (0.533) 
R2 0.5371 0.5370 0.5357 
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possible explanation for this could be that there was a backlash to EBA a while after its 
implementation. However, a 10% level of significance is not very relevant, which makes this odd 
result less concerning. Since some of our results change when we alter variables that allow us to 
analyze when the effect of the systems are picked up, we cannot draw strong conclusions from the 
results on our main model.   
7.3 Discussion of results 
 
When different estimation techniques are used, the results regarding the effects of AGOA and EBA on 
trade values vary. However, since the fixed effect estimator (see column combination panel) includes 
controls for exporter, year and importer heterogeneity, these results should be the most reliable and are 
therefore discussed. In this case, neither AGOA nor EBA affect trade on any significant level, which 
differs from the hypothesis that both AGOA and EBA have positive effects on trade. This can be due 
to several factors, as we will discuss below.  
 
Both AGOA and EBA have strict rules of origin that determine whether or not a product can be 
exported under the two preference systems. This increases administrative costs by requiring heavy 
documentation as well as severely hampering the range of inputs that can be used in production of 
exports. This is especially significant in terms of LDCs since their scales of production are relatively 
small and they might not have all the intermediate inputs they require for their exports. The product 
coverage of the two systems may also affect trade volumes of the preference systems. Many products 
that are considered to be import sensitive by the EU and US are major export industries in the LDCs. 
Since these products are excluded from preferences, LDCs are hindered from fully exploiting their 
potential benefits. This is the case for example under AGOA, where 120 out of the 514 agricultural 
products liberalized under AGOA still are subject to high tariff quotas (Cordon & Stern, 2011). Many 
of these products, for example peanuts and beef, could potentially be large export markets for the 
LDCs in question. Preferences could also be incentivizing expansion in the wrong sectors, which may 
be harmful to the economy in the long run. Product coverage is also important in terms of preference 
margins. If preference is granted under AGOA or EBA for products that already receive duty free 
access, the preferences systems will be useless. As mentioned earlier, many countries that receive 
preference under EBA are ACP countries that can export under Lomé preferences that already offer 
duty-free access for agricultural and mineral goods to the EU market (European Commission 2012).  
Exporters in these countries might not decide to change to EBA preferences since they would be 
required to learn a new system, which would make EBA preferences ineffective. Stability of access to 
the preferences is another area that may affect trade volumes. Although AGOA is more easily 
revoked, the preferences under both systems can be removed since neither the US or the EU are 
required to offer them.  
 
Other factors that are not examined in this study might significantly hamper trade, and might 
counteract any positive effects of AGOA or EBA.  For example, many LDCs do not have capacity to 
increase production. If preferences are granted in a sector where LDCs do not have a large capacity, 
the increased market access will not be enough to increase trade volumes. Other variables could 
include political instability and corruption as well as price volatility of primary products and poor 
infrastructure.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to compare two non-reciprocal trade preference systems: AGOA and 
EBA, in order to evaluate which one has been more successful in its goal of increasing trade volumes 
with developing countries. This is relevant since both systems represent active decisions by more 
developed countries to aid LDCs in their economic growth and development. We have compared the 
systems by estimating a fixed effect gravity model using trade flow data from LDCs to the EU15 
countries and the US between the years 1998 and 2006. Although previous research has examined the 
two systems separately, this is the first paper to compare them in one model.  
 
After comparing different aspects of the preference systems, it seems like EBA has the more 
appropriate conditions to succeed and thus should have a larger impact on trade volumes from LDCs 
compared to AGOA, as discussed in section 4.7. However, our results suggest that neither AGOA nor 
EBA has had any significant effect on trade flows from LDCs. This may be due to a variety of factors 
regarding the preference systems, for example strict rules of origin, lacking product coverage and 
preference margins as well precarious access to the preferences themselves. Another reason why EBA 
does not show any significant effects might be due to the existence other preference systems which 
hinder EBA from reaching its full potential. Exporters in the relevant countries may lack incentive to 
change to EBA preferences since they already enjoy duty-free access to the EU market. These issues 
should be taken into account by policy makers in order to make the systems more effective, especially 
considering the renewal of AGOA after 2015. Other issues that might hamper the effectiveness of 
AGOA and EBA could be more specific exporter-country conditions, for example lack of production 
capacity, political instability and poor infrastructure. These problems need to be addressed in order to 
give the exporting countries the circumstances to allow the preference systems to become effective.  
 
This study could be improved by including more variables, for example production capacity, political 
stability and infrastructure. Reducing the number of missing trade values could also improve the 
accuracy of the results. Further research should examine the effects on AGOA or EBA using more 
advanced estimation techniques. A suggestion would be to use a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
method. It would also be useful to examine the effects of AGOA and EBA on a more disaggregated 
level by looking at trade flows of certain products, since the results may be significantly different. The 
method would be improved by using a more specific binary variable in order to capture the effects of 
the preference systems. For example, exporter-country binary variables could be replaced by more 
specific product-level binary variables. Any additional research should examine the effects of AGOA 
and EBA on products that promote development, since development is the main goal of the preference 
systems. Another research question could be focusing on the dynamic effects caused by AGOA and 
EBA.  
 
Our results are surprising as they suggest that there is no difference between the systems since neither 
has a significant effect on trade. Even though our results are difficult to analyze and are not completely 
conclusive, this is the first study to directly compare AGOA and EBA in one model, and thus the 
results are an important addition that will allow us to delve deeper into this topic and more accurately 
evaluate the two systems in relation to each other.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. Least Developed Countries (LDCs), as defined by the UN 1998. 
  
Countries 
Afghanistan  
Angola  
Bangladesh  
Benin 
Bhutan 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cap Verde 
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Comoros  
Congo Democratic Republic 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau  
Haiti  
Kiribati  
Laos People’s Democratic Republic  
Lesotho  
Liberia  
Madagascar  
Malawi 
Maldives  
Mali   
Mauritania  
Mozambique  
Myanmar 
Nepal  
Niger  
Rwanda   
Samoa  
Sao Tome and Principal  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
Solomon Islands  
Somalia 
Sudan  
Timor-Leste  
Togo  
Tuvalu  
Uganda 
United Republic of Tanzania  
Vanuatu  
Yemen  
Zambia  
 
 
Appendix 2. List of EU15 countries 
  EU15 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
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Appendix 3. Regional cumulation groups allowed within EBA (European Commission, 2014d) 
 
 
 
 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Brunei-
Darussalam 
Bolivia Bangladesh Brazil 
Cambodia Colombia Bhutan Paraguay 
Indonesia Costa Rica India Uruguay 
Laos Ecuador Maldives  
Malaysia El Salvador Nepal  
Philippines Guatemala Pakistan  
Singapore Honduras Sri Lanka  
Thailand Nicaragua   
Vietnam Panama   
 Peru   
 Venezuela   
